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Financing Health for All in India 
 






India has set out ambitious goals for itself in the health sector in its Tenth Five Year Plan 
(2002-07). It is also a signatory to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. 
Attainment of these goals which are time-bound will require a massive scaling up of 
investment in health, especially in public primary health care. We argue for a ‘Health for 
All’ initiative on the part of the government akin to the ‘Education for All’ scheme which 
was launched nation-wide in 2001. The large amount of resources required for scaling up 
public investment in primary health need not be the constraint it is purported to be. We 
discuss several options that are available to the government for generating the necessary 
funds. Among the options that can generate resources domestically are reform of the 
government’s subsidies regime including implementing life-line tariffs, ear-marking 
taxes and disinvestment of loss-making public sector units.  
 
Health for All can also be financed by raising more resources via external assistance. 
Official development assistance to India at present is rather low given India’s per capita 
income and the scale of its needs in human development terms. The scale of official 
development aid to India should increase several folds and committed use of funds 
should be made by the government in health and other priority sectors.  With the 73rd and 
74th amendments to the Indian Constitution which created a third tier of government 
comprising of elected local bodies at the village and town ward levels, a decentralized 
system of service delivery will eventually become a reality in India and needs to be a part 
of any debate on the means and modes of improving human development outcomes in 
India. The current system of planning and allocation of funds at the sub-national level 
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Financing Health for All in India 
 





Health is intrinsically valuable and people value a long and healthy life as an end 
in itself. Good health is also a means to higher labor productivity and rising living 
standards. On the other hand, poor health is associated with large losses in labor 
productivity among working adults (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1988). Infections and 
malnutrition among children cast a long shadow on their adult lives and their future 
productivity. Many more mothers die due to pregnancy and child birth related reasons – 
deaths that can be avoided if there is adequate and convenient access to prenatal care and 
essential vaccines. In India, where less than 10% of the population has health insurance 
(mainly government employees and people working in the formal sector), episodes of ill-
health can push even initially non-poor households into chronic poverty. Investing in 
people’s health is therefore fundamental for attaining the important societal goals of 
economic growth, efficiency, equity, and poverty alleviation.  
 
In poor countries including India, more than half the burden of disease is due to 
communicable diseases. Cross-country differences in life expectancy at birth are largely 
due to differences in infant and child mortality rates (Schulz, 1999). Provision of 
immunization and prenatal care can reduce the current levels of very high infant, child 
and maternal mortality and morbidity quickly. These services are most cost-effectively 
provided at low level facilities such as sub-centers and primary health care centers in 
India. Even at low levels of economic development countries such as Sri Lanka, China, 
Jamaica and Costa Rica, as also the Indian state of Kerala have been able to attain health 
indicators that are close to those of middle and high income countries by providing an 
extensive network of primary health care facilities (Mehrotra and Jolly, 1998).     
 
India was a signatory to the Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 and national health 
policies and plan documents have recognized the importance of preventive and curative 
primary health care in maintaining and promoting people’s health. This was recently 
reiterated in the approach paper to the 10th Five Year Plan which recommended the 
provision of essential primary health care services free of cost to all individuals and 
essential health care service to people below the poverty line (Planning Commission 
2002/10th plan document). Post-independence, a vast public health infrastructure has been 
established in India that seeks to provide primary, secondary and tertiary levels of health 
care through a tiered system with sub-centers located within or close to habitations in 
rural areas for providing primary health care services, followed by primary health care 
centers, community health care centers and district hospitals located in urban areas.  
 
Despite this wide-spread network of public health facilities, India’s record in 
health is rather depressing. The infant mortality rate of 63 per 1000 live births and the 
under-five child mortality rate of 73 per 1000 live births are still rather high. The 
 4
maternal mortality rate is as high as 440 per 100,000 live births. Many diseases such as 
malaria, hepatitis, tetanus, leprosy and others that have disappeared from most countries 
are still common in India. In fact, India’s share in world leprosy is 68% (Dreze and Sen, 
2002).   
 
The official rhetoric notwithstanding and despite the economic and social 
importance of health, India’s commitment to health can be gauged from the amount of 
public resources it devotes to health. India currently spends 5.2% of its GDP on health of 
which public health expenditure is an abysmal less than 1% of GDP, the rest being 
accounted for by private expenditure (National Health Policy, 2002). Other developing 
countries on average spend around 3% of their GDP on health and developed countries 
around 5% of their GDP (Sachs and Bajpai, 2001). According to the Central Statistical 
Organization (CSO), in 1998-99, government expenditure on health (excluding 
expenditure on family welfare) was Rupees 1,058.8 billion or 0.6% of GDP. When Plan 
and Non-Plan expenditures of twenty six state governments and the Central Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare are summed, public expenditure on health was Rupees 
1,677.1 billion or a mere 0.95% of GDP. In per capita terms, India spends only $4 per 
capita annually on public health. According to the World Health Report (2000), only 
twelve other countries spend less than India on public health, most of them in Africa. 
 
Not only is the level of public health spending very low, the utilization of 
available resources is also highly inefficient resulting in a public health system that is 
dysfunctional. So much so that it is the much larger and the largely unregulated private 
sector that has become the de facto provider of health care services in India. 79% percent 
of all out-patient visits are made in the private sector where over three-fourths of the 
qualified medical practitioners work (Planning Commission, 2001). The poor too prefer 
to use the much costlier services provided by private practitioners even when they have 
access to subsidized or free public health care. The low levels of utilization of public 
health care services is both due to lack of a public health facility at a convenient distance 
for a significant section of the population but more importantly due to the very low 
quality of health care provided by the public sector.  
 
To improve both access as well as the quality of care provided under the public 
health system, greater investment in public health care is a pre-requisite. Given the 
current level of public health expenditure in India, it is unlikely that India will be able to 
make any significant progress towards the attainment of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) to which it is a signatory or its even more ambitious health targets as 
stated in the 10th Five Year plan 2002-07 (Table1 in the Appendix). The National 
Common Minimum Program adopted by the United Progressive Alliance in 2004 after it 
formed the government at the centre agreed to increase public expenditure on health to 2-
3% of GDP. The central government’s budget estimates for 2005-06 for outlays on health 
and family welfare shows an increase of 22% over last year, from Rupees 84.20 billion to 
Rupees 102.80 billion. These are intentions and actions on the right path, but they are not 
enough, given the size of the task, and the urgency with which it needs to be faced. It has 
become commonplace, however, to cite the weak fiscal position of both the central and 
the state governments as the binding constraint that is keeping the government from 
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committing to the resource requirements for expanding and improving the primary health 
care system in the country.   
 
In this paper, we propose various options that are available to the government to 
generate the necessary resources to strengthen the system of primary health care in the 
country: to increase access and to make it more efficient, equitable, and responsive to the 
demand for health care in the country. Not all these options are entirely original, but the 
fear that they will not pass muster given the political history of the country have kept 
them away from being given serious consideration. However, India has currently shown 
refreshing willingness to be bold and to experiment. It seeks a leader’s position in the 
new world economy. Like the Indian cricket team, it has to learn to ‘plan for success’ 
(Bajpai et al, 2005) and to create and generate the necessary political consensus for its 
plans.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of the government 
in investing more resources in the public health care system. Section 3 lists and 
elaborates on the various options that are available to the government for generating more 
resources which can then be used for health. In Section 4, the role of planning and 
allocation at the sub-national level is briefly discussed and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Role of the Government: Higher Public Spending  
 
The very low level of public health expenditure remains a root cause of the poor 
performance of the health system in India. The wasteful and inefficient utilization of 
available resources further aggravates the delivery of primary health care services which 
when they are provided are of poor quality. With more than 80% of health care 
expenditure being financed privately, India has one of the highest levels of out-of-pocket 
expenditure for health care in the world. Only Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Georgia, Myanmar and Sierra Leone have higher out-of-pocket expenditures 
(Misra, 2003). Moreover, it is the poor who suffer the most as a result who have to bear 
the double burden of poverty and ill-health. According to the 52nd round of the National 
Sample Survey 1995-6, out-of-pocket expenditures for the bottom quintile of the income 
distribution accounted for nearly 12% of household income and for the top quintile 
around 14%. With thin and/or missing health insurance markets, illness can result in 
chronic poverty as households bear the costs of illness by selling off productive assets or 
taking on debilitating loans. 
  
Given widespread poverty and the very sharp health inequalities that exist in India 
by income class, the provision of health care, especially primary health care has to be a 
social concern and primarily the responsibility of the state. Primary health care has to be 
financed by public spending and in order to provide basic health care coverage to all; per 
capita expenditure on health care in India needs to rise by much more than is currently 
the case, and in a relatively short period of time. This is essential for improvement in 
health outcomes from its current harsh levels. It is also necessary if the health targets 
envisioned in the 10th plan are to be reached. 
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Public spending per capita has to rise from $4 to at least $30 per capita which will 
be around 6% of GDP for resources to be adequate for expanding coverage and 
improving quality on a sustainable basis. According to the estimates of the Commission 
on Macroeconomics and Health which stimulated the cost of essential services that the 
state must provide, public spending per capita in low income countries will have to be 
within the range of $30-$45 per capita (CMH, 2001). Along with increased finances, 
governance and institutional reforms will have to be undertaken to ensure a well-
functioning and efficient health system that is transparent and accountable.     
 
In the current policy environment of pro-market reforms and in the face of 
persisting fiscal imbalances both at the central and state levels of government, state 
presence in health matters is being debated, influenced to some extent by corporate 
India’s opinions (Dreze and Sen, 2002). The notion taking root is that the state should 
reduce its presence in the health care sector and allow the private sector a greater role in 
the financing and provision of health services. The debate is, to say the least, lopsided as 
it does not pay attention to the reasons why health and especially primary health care 
should essentially be a public concern. Nor does it see the fundamental conflict of such a 
stance with the other social goals of poverty alleviation and equity. Moreover, historical 
experiences of present day advanced countries before their take-off into economic growth 
and of current low-income countries that have successfully made the health transition 
show that health attainments in these countries have categorically been the result of 
greater public intervention, not less. Contemporarily too in advanced industrial countries, 
health care is largely a social concern with universal socialization of medicine and health 
care in many countries.  
 
Health for All: A Sarva Swasthya Abhiyan for India 
 
Health is a state subject in India which means that the primary responsibility of 
financing and providing health care rests with the state governments. The central 
government’s role has been to fund centrally sponsored schemes, to develop policies and 
guidelines and to provide statutory grants or general transfers to the states. However, the 
quantity and quality of health care provision varies widely across states reflecting their 
widely varying levels of economic development, their health sector priorities and their 
current and past investments in health. Similarly, there are wide variations in health 
outcomes across states, across socio-economic groups and across rural and urban areas. 
In 2002, infant mortality rate varied from a low of 14 per 1000 live births in Kerala to 97 
per 1000 live births in Orissa1. The maternal mortality rate in Uttar Pradesh was as high 
as 707 per 100,000 live births in 1996-97. The total number of malaria positive cases in 
2000 was 2.2 million of which more than half were in the two states of Madhya Pradesh 
and Orissa. The rural infant mortality rate was 75 per 1000 live births in 2002 compared 
to 44 per 1000 live births for urban areas (NHP, 2002). Given these very sharp divisions 
across states, the central government could take the initiative of providing an umbrella 
program that would reduce the inequalities in health outcomes across states. 
 
                                                 
1 Regions with high IMR and child mortality have high fertility rates as households tend to have larger 
number of children and vice versa Sachs (2005). Orissa and Kerala are striking examples in this regard. 
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The National Health Policy 1983 (NHP 1983) had proposed a “Health for All by 
the Year 2000” program through the provision of comprehensive primary health care 
services. While the year 2000 has come and gone, the need for a nation-wide health for 
all program has become more urgent than ever. The NHP (1983), however, did not spell 
out any concrete steps as to how such a program will be implemented. In November 
2001, the government of India (GOI) launched its ambitious centrally sponsored scheme 
for the universalization of elementary education (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan or SSA) to 
attain the goals of universalization of primary education by the year 2007 and 
universalization of elementary education by the year 2010.2 The total project cost of the 
SSA has been estimated at $3.5 billion of which $1 billion has been pledged by three 
donors, namely the World Bank, DFID and the EC. Education in India is on the 
‘concurrent’ list. This means that both the central and the state governments share 
responsibilities with respect to the financing and provision of education. However, in 
practice, it is the state governments that have the major role in financing and providing 
education. But as the case of the SSA shows, a political consensus towards a nation-wide 
program with clear benefits can be generated and implemented in partnership with the 
state governments. In a similar vein, a Health for All program (Sarva Swasthya Abhiyan) 
could be launched in India building on the grounds created by the SSA (Bajpai and 
Sachs, 2004). The modalities of financing and implementing the program can be modeled 
along the lines of the SSA with appropriate modifications in program design and 
implementation strategies that are pertinent to the health sector and the health needs and 
priorities of the people. The SSA experience can be further valuable in terms of deriving 
lessons in terms of what works and what does not.  
 
3. Options for mobilizing resources for financing public health 
 
As is amply evident, India grossly under-invests in the health sector whereas if it 
wants to meet its development goals of economic growth and human development, both 
the central and the state governments need to commit larger amounts of public resources 
to health, and specifically to primary health care. To raise resources for financing a health 
for all initiative, the government has to move beyond current perceptions that the already 
large fiscal deficits of the central and state governments will make it hard if not 
impossible to raise the required quantum of resources and politically commit to higher 
levels of expenditure on social services. The case of SSA shows that it is possible to build 
a broad-based consensus on a large nation-wide human development program when its 
high social benefit is recognized. To mobilize additional resources for financing public 
health, various options are available, some of which of we discuss below. 
 
To raise the additional 5% of GDP for increased public spending on health, both the 
governments at the centre and the state levels will have to reorient and restructure their 
fiscal policies. Currently, India’s fiscal deficit is around 10% of GDP as a result of fiscal 
profligacy and mismanagement since the late 1980s. By bringing down the fiscal deficit 
and by reallocating funds from sectors such as infrastructure where the private sector can 
come in, India can generate the additional resources required for expanding and 
                                                 
2 Elementary education in India refers to the first eight years of schooling, of which the first five grades 
belong to the primary level of schooling. 
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improving the public health system. Moreover, the fiscal deficit should be reduced by 
cuts in existing expenditures rather than by raising taxes. Current government 
expenditures (centre and states combined) are already at very high levels at more than a 
third of GDP and further increases in expenditure that are financed by general tax 
revenues would be very difficult to implement (Sachs and Bajpai, 2001).   
 
The fiscal deficit should be reduced by reducing expenditure on certain items of the 
government budget such as wasteful and inefficient explicit and implicit subsidies. These 
public savings can then be used for financing essential social development initiatives 
including a universal health for all program. Instead of general tax revenues being used to 
finance spending programs, special taxes could be earmarked to do so. India has recently 
implemented a 2% cess on certain taxes, revenues from which are to be specifically used 
for education. Assistance from abroad is another attractive policy option for governments 
of developing countries compared to the option of borrowing from the market, both of 
which tend to crowd out private investment while increasing the market rate of interest. 
External assistance funds are generally in the form of grants and any loan component is 
provided at very low rates of interest, the principal to be returned after a long period of 
time. We discuss these options in further detail below. 
 
(1) Public Expenditure Restructuring: Subsidy Reform 
 
Among the options available to the government to raise resources to finance publicly 
provided primary health care is the gradual reduction and/or elimination of wasteful and 
inefficient subsidies. Subsidization by the government of the provision of goods and 
services is justified when there are large positive externalities present. In such a situation, 
without government intervention, society will either not provide the good or service or 
the provision will be lower than what is socially optimal. Governments also subsidize the 
provision of goods and services to attain redistributive and equity goals. Examples 
include food subsidies to populations below the poverty line and price support for farm 
output. A third reason for providing subsidies is the provision of merit goods – when a 
certain good or service, such as vaccination, is considered essential for the well-being of 
the population. However, in the case of India, more than 50% of the subsidization cannot 




In 1999-2000, subsidies accounted for 14.3% of the central government’s revenue 
receipts. This was a little less than 1.5% of GDP. A large share of these subsidies was for 
goods and services which do not match either any externality associated efficiency or 
equity criteria. These included subsidies to goods and services such as manures and 
fertilizers, oilseeds and pulses, milk, fish, power, transport, iron and steel, sericulture, 
chemicals, textiles, paper and newsprint, atomic fuels, railways etc.3 In these sectors no 
significant externalities exist and their subsidization cannot be justified either on 
efficiency or equity grounds. On the contrary, their subsidization leads to allocationary 
                                                 
3 The government also directly provides hotel and tourism services for which no justification for either 
government financing or government provision can be made.   
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distortions creating waste and inefficiency. Moreover, these subsidies have led to large 
fiscal deficits at both the central and state levels of governments. As a matter of fact, 
fiscal mismanagement has become the hallmark of fiscal management in India. Starting 
from the mid-1980s onwards, the trend of gross fiscal imbalance has continued all the 
way to the present, slowing down moderately only for a short while after the economic 
reforms of 1991 but then deteriorating again. In 1990-91, the combined fiscal deficit of 
the central and state governments was 9.6% of GDP. With fiscal restraint as part of the 
reform process, the combined fiscal deficit4 declined to 7.4% of GDP in 1992-3. In 1998-
9, however, the fiscal deficit had climbed up again to its pre-reform level and stood at 
9.5% of GDP (Report of the 11th Finance Commission, GOI, 2000). As a result human 
development has suffered with under-investment in critical areas of health and education 
as both the central and state governments have cut back on capital expenditures while 
continuing their large scale subsidization. 
 
Implicit Subsidies: Reforming State Electricity Boards 
 
Very poor cost-recovery in public sector units leads to very large levels of implicit 
subsidies. Subsidies are implicit when publicly provided goods and services are priced 
below the cost of providing them. They are the unrecovered costs – excess of aggregate 
costs over returns – of providing public goods and services, especially social and 
economic services (Srivastava and Bhujang Rao, 2004).  According to the Report of the 
11th Financial Commission, for the central government, for the years 1995-96 and 1996-
97, cost recovery was as low as 8.4% for social services and 16.6% for economic 
services, implying 91% and 83% of implicit subsidization (NIFPF, 1997). For the state 
governments, cost-recovery was even lower at 2.15% for social services and 10.75% for 
economic services for the years 1994-99.   
 
In India, almost 85% of investment in state-level public enterprises is on 
electricity utilities. The State Electricity Boards (SEBs) are responsible for generating 
and distributing power, setting tariffs and collecting revenues. Instead of generating a 
minimum of 3% return on investment as stipulated by the Electricity Supply Act of 
1948,5 the SEBs have been incurring humongous financial losses every year for over two 
decades.6 In 1999-2000, the value of fixed assets of the electricity utilities was Rupees 
68,000 which should have generated a minimum return of Rupees 20.40 billion. Instead, 
the SEBs registered a financial loss of Rupees 230 billion which was nearly 34% of the 
                                                 
4 Fiscal deficit is the total borrowing requirements. It is total expenditure minus total revenue plus capital 
receipts. Revenue deficit is revenue expenditure minus revenue receipts. Primary deficit is fiscal deficit 
minus interest payments. 
5 The Electricity Supply Act 1948, Section 49 states that ‘the Board shall, after taking credit for subvention 
from the state government under section 63, carry on its operations and adjust its tariff so as to ensure that 
the total revenues in any year of account shall, after meeting all expenses, leave such surplus as is not less 
than 3% or such higher percentage as the state government may specify.’ 
6 The SEBs finance their excess expenditure primarily by transfers from the state governments, bonds and 
debentures raised either on their own or through state government guarantee and by withholding payments 
on their purchase of power, fuel and equipment from suppliers, especially public sector suppliers. In 2001, 
the total debt of SEBs to power sector companies was Rupees 289.39 billion of which 59% was principal 
(Sankar, 2004). 
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fixed value of assets and nearly 1.15% of GDP. In 2000-2001, the losses of the SEBs 
incurred by the SEBs were over Rupees 260 billion of which only Rupees 6,000 was 
accounted for in the state budgets as explicit subsidies. These losses were equivalent to 
1.2% of GDP. Irrational pricing policies, losses due to theft of power called transmission 
and distribution losses (T & D) and inefficient power supply mechanisms have resulted in 
a public sector utility that is a considerable drain on state finances. In the face of large 
financial deficits and due to general economic mismanagement, the SEBs neglect 
maintenance of assets, neglect preventive maintenance, take poor investment and 
technical decisions and in general produce a poor quality product at a very high cost.    
 
There is immediate need to reform the SEBs and plug the draining of resources 
from the state budget. The SEBs need to rationalize their tariff structure and bring pricing 
in line with costs incurred, ensure universal metering, bring transmission and distribution 
losses under control allowing the state governments to eventually withdraw their support 
and enable private investors to enter the electricity market on a larger scale. The savings 
generated from reforming SEBs have the potential of freeing up resources – nearly 1.2% 




 Subsidy reforms can also take the form of ‘life-line tariffs’: charging highly 
subsidized initial prices for lower levels of consumption, and higher prices for higher 
units of consumption (Bajpai et al, 2005). People living below the poverty line in rural 
India can be given fixed and limited quantities of water, electricity and fertilizer at zero 
cost. For any consumption above this basic fixed package, the consumer will be charged 
an unsubsidized price that would fully cover the cost of supplying the service. Life-line 
tariffs can therefore generate large budgetary savings while also ensuring that the basic 
infrastructural needs of poor, rural households are met. They also make targeting easier. 
The savings realized from life-line tariffs can be invested in health (and other social 
sectors). 
  
(2) Earmarked Taxes 
 
 Earmarking taxes for an identified specific program are easier to implement 
politically than a general new tax which can give rise to much public and political 
resistance. These taxes can be imposed either at the central or the state levels of 
government. India recently imposed a 2% cess on income tax, corporation tax, excise and 
customs duties and service tax, the revenues from which have been earmarked for 
primary education, including the provision of mid-day meals in schools. This cess is 
expected to yield Rupees 40-50 billion, around 0.1% of GDP. There are risks associated 
with earmarked taxes as given the fungibility of funds; the possibility of diversion of 
funds for other than primary health care always exists. To this end adequate safeguards 
will need to be built. International experience suggests that if properly administered, 
earmarked funds can be used to raise additional resources for funding education and 
health. Indiana, Arkansas and South Carolina in the United States used earmarked taxes 
for educational financing purposes. Similarly, Korea introduced a five year education tax 
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on liquor, tobacco, interest and dividend income and on banking and insurance industries 
raising 15% of its education budget in this manner. Earmarked taxes have also been used 
in Latin America and Africa. Brazil used a federal levy on financial transactions which 
was used to finance health care funding.  
 
 
(3) Disinvestment of Public Sector Units 
 
 The central and state governments could work on major programs of 
disinvestment of central and state public sector units (PSUs) and announce that the 
proceeds would be spent on the health sector. For the central PSUs, all the sitting 
members of Parliament (Lok Sabha) could be given a share of the disinvestment 
proceeds, (those constituencies which are predominantly urban could be given a lower 
share) but with the specific purpose of the funds being used ONLY on primary health 
care given their respective constituency’s needs and priorities. Similarly, for the state 
PSUs, such proceeds could be for all the sitting members of the respective State 
Legislative Assemblies. 
 
 This will, of course, require strict monitoring, preferably from the Prime 
Minister’s office for the central PSUs and from the Chief Ministers’ in the case of the 
state PSUs so as to ensure that the funds are being utilized for the purpose they were 
meant for. Such a scheme is likely to bring together the Members of Parliament/Members 
of State Legislative Assemblies from across party lines since they will be able to see the 
gains for themselves as well as for their constituencies. This could possibly unite them to 
support disinvestment plans on the floor of the House. Securing political accountability to 
such an idea at the level of Members of Parliament/Members of State Legislative 
Assemblies is likely to help a great deal in dealing with the opposition to disinvestment 
plans from trade unions and others traditionally opposed to them. This might seem like a 
long shot, but should such a scheme work, it will not only help the government withdraw 
relatively easily from the loss-making public sector, from running textile mills to steel 
plants, from managing hotels to operating airlines and a variety of other sectors, but will 
also divert resources towards primary health care.   
 
(3) External Assistance 
 
Development assistance from abroad can supplement resources raised 
domestically to finance public investment, especially if the options available to 
governments to raise resources through domestic savings are limited and are likely to 
have adverse effects on the economy by crowding out resources available to the private 
sector and raising the market interest rate. Development assistance from abroad can 
therefore add to domestic savings without adversely affecting domestic investment which 
is essential for economic growth.   
 
The high concessionality of external assistance is a particularly attractive 
characteristic of external assistance for financing public investment in goods and services 
that have public goods characteristics. The benefits of such goods and services are widely 
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dispersed and the costs cannot be captured. If such public investment was made out of 
market borrowings, repayments on the basis of returns from such investment would not 
have been possible. On the other hand, external assistance with public investment of a 
social nature allows governments to retain the social returns generated.   
 
On the part of the donors, development assistance can be justified as the financing of 
global public goods of which health of populations in poor countries afflicted by 
infectious diseases is a part. If health is a global public good, developing countries on 
their own will not have the incentives to provide adequately for it. 
 
The federal government’s ‘Education for All’ project (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, or 
SSA) is an excellent example of how additional public investments could be mobilized to 
enhance the quality and quantity of primary education for all7.  This is a really good 
project and model of aid for India -- a national project on social priorities, and a few big 
donors that pool their resources. Currently, India receives $1.4 billion in the form of 
official development assistance. This amounts to approximately $1.40 per Indian and is 
far below what some other countries with India’s level of income receive (Bajpai et al, 
2005). The level of official development assistance to India should increase at least four- 
to five-fold. India’s credit-worthiness should generate the necessary trust among the 
donors for this amount of assistance. In order for India to end extreme poverty, we are of 
the view that India should receive as much as $4 - $7 billion per year of budgetary aid for 
high-priority well-targeted, mainly rural social and infrastructure spending.  
 
The IDA of the World Bank should be a major focal point for expanding the aid 
flows to India. IDA is now the single largest source of donor funds for basic social 
services in the poorest countries.  In the 12 months to June 30, 2003, IDA’s support for 
projects was targeted at human development such as education, health, social safety nets, 
water supply and sanitation (44%), infrastructure (26%), and agriculture and rural 
development (11%). 
 
IDA does a number of important things. First, it provides the world’s single 
largest flow of low-cost development assistance to poor countries, though not enough of 
it and not at low enough cost. A concessional loan typically carries no interest and offers 
a much longer grace period and maturity than other forms of financing could provide.  
IDA’s standard concessional loan (called a ‘credit’) does not require principal 
repayments until 10 years after it is signed, with a final maturity of 40 years.  Second, it 
directs its outlays towards the priorities identified by the recipient countries. Third, IDA 
harmonizes donor resources. Third, in the case of IDA, the donor governments agree, 
wisely, to pool their resources into a single basket that can back the specific strategy of 
                                                 
7 As part of this project, three agencies -- the World Bank, UK's Department for International Development 
and the European Commission -- are providing $1 billion for this project. World Bank’s International 
Development Association will provide $500 million, while the DfID will contribute $300 million and 
European Commission $200 million. The project is estimated to cost $3.5 billion. The Centre and state 
governments would provide the remaining $2.5 billion for the project that aims to achieve universal 
enrollment and completion of elementary education of children of 6-14 years of age by 2010. 
 
 13
the recipient country. Fourth, IDA commits its resources over a three-year time horizon 
rather than the one-year donor budget cycle typical of bilateral aid. Finally, it aims to 
base its allocations on good performance, using indicators for governance and economic 
management. 
 
A back of the envelope accounting 
 
To reduce the fiscal deficit to generate the additional resources required for 
funding health care, the following prime areas of potential expenditure reduction over a 
three year period can be considered. These items of expenditure reduction include options 




Percent of GDP 
Reduction in subsidies 
Central power sector undertakings support to SEBs 
Reduced infrastructure investments, taken over by private sector projects 
Reduced interest payments on account of contractionary fiscal measures 






State level Expenditures 
SEB commercial losses (excluding explicit subsidies) 
Water sector reform including rise in water tariffs 
Transport reform including rise in transport tariffs 
Reduced infrastructure investments, taken over by private sector projects 








  The above table shows that given the political will to take hard but essential 
decisions, it is possible to raise domestically additional resources to finance human 
development in India. Moreover, earmarked taxes and external assistance from abroad 
can further supplement the government budget for its social spending programs with an 
additional 1-1.05% of GDP. We emphasize that these are rough and suggestive estimates. 
The purpose of doing such an accounting exercise is to point to possibilities that have so 
far not found any place on the debate informing the financing of human development in 
India, especially health and education.  
  
4. Sub-national planning and allocation  
   
In India, health is a ‘state’ subject. This means that the primary responsibility of 
financing and provision of public health services rests with the state governments. The 
central government plays the role of an overseer by providing directives and guidance 
through the formulation of national policies and by the transfer of funds via its plan 
expenditure largely for centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) and other central schemes 
which are either wholly subsidized by the central government or are co-financed by the 
central and the state governments. States account for nearly three quarters of all public 
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expenditure on health, the rest being central government expenditure and tied grants to 
the state. While, plan expenditure dominates the central government’s budget, non-plan 
expenditure dominates the budgets of the state governments as they are responsible for 
recurrent costs. The central government makes all the decisions regarding new 
investment and programs and central funds dominate the financing of new primary health 
care facilities in the states through plan investments, jointly sponsored public health 
schemes and centrally sponsored family welfare programs (Berman, 1998). The size of 
the states’ non-plan expenditure is also determined by the quinquennial awards made to 
the states by the Finance Commission for recurrent costs of past investment. State 
budgets are therefore, significantly shaped by central-state fiscal relationship and 
concomitant transfer of funds. And state level planning and budgetary allocations with 
respect to the health sector is not independent of the complex division of responsibilities 
between the central and state governments.  
 
In practice, state level plans vis-à-vis the health sector have been largely ad-hoc 
with plans in one year being updates and revisions of plans from the past. The wide 
variations across states in the provision of basic minimum services and even within 
states, wide variations across regions and districts reveals the disconnect between the 
reality of government plans and policies and their official rhetoric. States and districts 
with the poorest health status also tend to have the poorest health infrastructure in place.  
Even when additional funds are provided to fill the existing resource gaps, the practice of 
the states have been to use the funds in a manner that does not address the problem: for 
example, constructing more buildings rather than the missing package of basic minimum 
services for which the funds were made available (Nayar, 1999).  
 
Planning that takes cognizance of people’s needs requires a democratic set up for 
decision-making below the state level. Without such a system in place, state level 
planning remains over-centralized and removed from the needs and interests of the 
ultimate beneficiaries. Fiscal decentralization by moving government closer to people can 
lead to improved service delivery of those services that do not have major spillover 
effects, greater community participation in governance and hence better accountability on 
the part of government officials, greater willingness to pay and increased revenue 
mobilization with broadening of the tax net.  
 
With the 73rd (and 74th) amendments to the Indian Constitution in 1992, the scope 
for levels of government lower than the state, at the district, block and village levels, to 
play a larger role in the delivery of basic services to the people has increased. Twenty 
nine subjects have been devolved to these local bodies of government, known as the 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). They have been assigned taxation powers as well as 
decision-making authority over expenditures. In most states, the PRIs are now in place. 
However, there are large inter-state variations in the characteristics of the Panchayats – in 
their size, composition, methods and norms of elections and the powers devolved to 
them. This is due to the fact that the implementation of many of the amendment 
provisions has been left to the state governments.  
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However, international experience suggests that the share of local governments in 
expenditure is low and there is reluctance in general on the part of supra-local 
governments to devolve fiscal powers to local governments. The arguments against fiscal 
decentralization include the reduced ability of central governments to pursue 
macroeconomic policy, the lack of local capacity to execute the responsibilities assigned 
to them and the increased probability of local capture and corruption (Bird, 2001; World 
Bank, 2004). There is also the potential danger of widening of social inequities as 
different localities will have a different fiscal base and different preferences for 
distribution. The central government therefore will need to retain adequate vertical 
control of the tax system for better redistribution and harmonization of the tax system 
(Bardhan, 1998). 
 
The experience with decentralization in India since the passage of the 
constitutional amendments too have been varied, with some states such as Kerala, 
Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh having made some progress albeit imperfectly,8 and 
others where though the local governments are in place but nothing much else has 
happened. The common major difficulties that have emerged across decentralization 
experiences in various states are the conflicts between the state and local governments 
over the transfer of funds resulting in adequate financial devolution, the non-cooperation 
of bureaucracy with the PRIs, red tapism and corruption. Among the political and 
wealthy elite there is reluctance to transfer political power to women and backward 
classes. The most important obstacle in the functioning of the PRIs, however, has been 
the lack of technical and administrative capacities at the local level and lack of political 
education among the people about their rights and duties vis-à-vis the Panchayati Raj 
(Behar and Kumar, 2002). Moreover, there is very little data on the financial status of 
local government bodies. Proper financial record keeping is lackadaisical or non-existent 
at the local level.  
 
Bird (2004) identifies a set of necessary and desirable conditions for fiscal 
decentralization to be successful and comprehensive. Among the necessary conditions 
are: the council must be locally elected, locally appointed chief officers, a significant set 
of expenditure and taxation responsibilities, budget-making autonomy, a hard budget 
constraint and transparency. The desirable conditions include: freedom from excessive 
mandates and unconditional transfers from higher levels of governments and borrowing 
powers. Thus, while India has moved in the right direction in terms of bringing 
government closer to the people, the design and implementation of the decentralization 
program still has a long way to go. However, given the dismal ground reality of the 
primary health care system as it currently exists, governance and development from 






                                                 
8 Kerala has been the most successful among all states though there is a large variation in the performance 




In the sections above, we have outlined and discussed various options that will 
enable the government to raise the resources it needs to create a public primary health 
care system in the country, with the objective of attaining ‘Health for All’. Such a system 
can be along the same lines as the flagship Education for All program of the central 
government that has been underway since 2001. The available options include both 
domestic sources as well as external ones, such as the use of the IDA facility of the 
World Bank. Arguing for the need to create such a health care system and to invest more 
resources in publicly provided primary health care, in this paper we have intentionally 
focused on the means to raise the necessary resources for doing so. This is not to de-
emphasize or not consider important the other critical aspect of creating a viable Health 
for All system of primary health care in the country: the issue of the way in which funds 
are used. Institutional and governance issues are as important as the adequacy of 
resources for any system of public provision to deliver efficiently and equitably. Weak 
accountability, rent seeking and misuse of public funds have resulted in gross wastage of 
the vast public health infrastructure already in place. However, one of the obstacles that 
has kept the government from even envisioning an umbrella program, is the concomitant 
resource requirements. In this paper, therefore, we have tried to show how resources need 
not be the most binding constraint for investing in people’s health. The means are there 
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Appendix:   
 




Eradicate Polio and Yaws 
Eliminate Leprosy 
Eliminate Kala Azar 
Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis 
Achieve zero level growth of HIV/AIDS 
Reduce mortality due to TB, Malaria and other 
vector-borne diseases by 50% 
Reduce prevalence of blindness to 0.5% 
Reduce Infant Mortality Rate to less than 30 per 
1000 live births 
Reduce Maternal Mortality Rate to less than 100 
per 100,000 live births 
Increase utilization of public health services from 
the current level of less than 20% to more than 
75% 
Establish an integrated system of surveillance, 



















Source: 10th Plan Document, Planning Commission, GOI 2000 
 
 
